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Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. 
Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability 
and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising 
and improving upon the so-called ‘decision-theoretic approach’ 
(Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in 
the recently proposed constructor theory of information – where quantum 
theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which 
are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-
theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement 
outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), 
necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the 
appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements 
can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient 
conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made 
under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch–Wallace-type 
argument – thus defining a class of decision-supporting 
superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability 
of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In 
addition, in this version some of the argument’s assumptions, 
previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical 
properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles. 
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1. Introduction 
Quantum theory without the Born Rule (hereinafter: unitary quantum theory) is a 
deterministic theory (Wallace, 2012), whose viability as a universal physical theory 
has long been debated (Deutsch, 1985; Albert, 2010; Kent, 2010; Wallace, 2012). A 
contentious issue is how to reconcile its determinism with the unpredictability and 
appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements (Albert, 2010; Saunders, 2010; 
Kent, 2010).  Specifically, two problems emerge: (i) how unpredictability can occur in 
unitary quantum theory, since, absent the Born rule and ‘collapse’-like processes, 
single measurements do not deliver single observed outcomes (see section 1.2); and 
(ii) how unitary quantum theory, despite its being non-probabilistic, can adequately 
account for the appearance of stochasticity observed in certain repeated measurements 
(see section 1.3).  
Problems (i) and (ii) also arise in the recently proposed constructor theory of 
information (Deutsch & Marletto, 2015) (see sections 2 and 3). In that context unitary 
quantum theory is regarded as one of a class of theories, superinformation theories, 
most of them yet to be discovered, which are elegantly characterised by a simple, 
exact, constructor-theoretic condition. Specifically, certain physical systems 
permitted under such theories – called superinformation media – exhibit all the most 
distinctive properties of quantum systems. Like all theories conforming to the 
principles (Deutsch, 2013) of constructor theory, superinformation theories are 
expressed solely via statements about possible and impossible tasks, and are necessarily 
non-probabilistic. So a task being ‘possible’ in this sense means that it could be 
performed with arbitrarily high accuracy – not that it will happen with non-zero 
probability. Just as for unitary quantum theory, therefore, an explanation is required 
for how superinformation theories could account for unpredictable measurement 
outcomes and apparently stochastic processes.  
To provide this, I shall first provide an exact criterion for unpredictability in constructor 
theory (section 4); then I shall show that unpredictability necessarily arises in 
superinformation theories (and hence in quantum theory) as a result of the 
impossibility of cloning certain states – thereby addressing problem (i). Then, I shall 
generalise and improve upon an existing class of proposed solutions to problem (ii) 
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in quantum theory – known as the decision-theoretic approach (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 
2003, 2007, 2012), by recasting them in constructor theory. This will entail expressing 
a number of physical conditions on superinformation theories for them to support 
the decision-theoretic approach – thus defining a class of decision-supporting 
superinformation theories, which include unitary quantum theory (sections 5, 6, 7). As I 
shall outline in section 1.4, switching to constructor theory widens the domain of 
applicability of such approaches, to cover potential generalisations of quantum 
theory that may be discovered amongst decision-supporting superinformation theories; it 
also clarifies the assumptions on which such approaches are based, by revealing that 
most of them are not decision-theoretic, as previously thought (Deutsch 1999, 
Wallace 2012), but physical. 
1.1 The status of constructor theory 
Constructor theory is a proposed fundamental theory of physics (Deutsch, 2013), 
consisting of principles aiming to underlie other physical theories (such as laws of 
motion of elementary particles, etc.), called subsidiary theories in this context. Its mode 
of explanation requires physical laws to be expressed exclusively via statements about 
which physical transformations (more precisely, tasks – section 2) are possible, which 
are impossible, and why. This is a radical departure from the prevailing conception of 
fundamental physics, which instead expresses laws as predictions about what happens, 
given dynamical equations and boundary conditions in space-time.  
Constructor theory is not just a framework (such as, e.g., resource theory, (Coecke, 
Fritz & Spekkens, 2014), or category theory (Abramsky & Coecke, 2008)) for 
reformulating existing theories:  its principles are proposed physical laws. They express 
regularities among subsidiary theories, including new regularities that the 
prevailing conception cannot adequately capture. It thereby addresses some of those 
theories’ unsolved problems. Constructor theory’s principles supplement subsidiary 
theories, illuminating their underlying meaning and informing the development of 
successors, just as, for instance, the principle of energy conservation does. 
In this work I appeal to the principles of the constructor theory of information (Deutsch 
& Marletto, 2015). They express the regularities in physical laws that are implicitly 
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required by theories of information (e.g. Shannon’s), via exact statements about 
possible and impossible tasks, thus giving a fully physical meaning to the hitherto 
fuzzily defined notion of information. Notions such as measurement and 
distinguishability, which are notoriously problematic to express in quantum theory 
yet constitute the foundation of the decision-theoretic approach, can be exactly 
expressed in constructor theory.  
1.2 Unpredictability 
Unpredictability is a property that must be clearly distinguished from randomness. 
The distinction is difficult to pin down in quantum theory, especially unitary 
quantum theory, but can be naturally expressed in the more general context of 
constructor theory. Unpredictability occurs in quantum systems even given perfect 
knowledge of dynamical laws and initial conditions2. When a perfect measurer of a 
quantum observable  Xˆ  – say the x-component of the spin of a spin-½ particle – is 
presented with the particle in a superposition (or mixture) of eigenvectors of  Xˆ , say 
0  and 1 , it is impossible to predict reliably which outcome (0 or 1) will be 
observed. But in unitary quantum theory, a perfect measurement of  Xˆ  is merely a 
unitary transformation on the source  Sa  (the system to be measured) and the target 
 Sb  (the ‘tape’ of the measurer): 
 
 
0 a 0 b
U⎯ →⎯ 0 a 0 b
1 a 0 b
U⎯ →⎯ 1 a 1 b
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭
⎪
  
which implies, given the linearity of quantum theory 
 
 
α 0 a +β 1 a( ) 0 b U⎯ →⎯ α 0 a 0 b +β 1 a 1 b( )   
                                                
2 Thus it is sharply distinct from phenomena such as classical chaos. 
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for arbitrary complex amplitudes α ,β . Since no wave-function collapse is assumed, 
there is in reality no single “observed outcome” when the superposition is input. All 
possible outcomes occur simultaneously: in what sense are they unpredictable? 
Additional explanations are needed – e.g. Everett’s (1957) is that the observer 
differentiates into multiple instances, each observing a different outcome, whence 
the impossibility of predicting which one (Saunders, 2010; Wallace, 2012). Such 
accounts, however, can only ever be approximate in quantum theory, as they rely on 
emergent notions such as observed outcomes and ‘universes’ (Wallace, 2012). Also, 
unpredictability is a counterfactual property: it is not about what will happen, but 
what cannot be made to happen. So, while the prevailing conception struggles to 
accommodate it, constructor theory does so naturally. Just as the impossibility of 
cloning a set of non-orthogonal quantum states is an exact property (Wootters & 
Zurek, 1982), in this paper I shall express unpredictability exactly as a consequence of 
the impossibility of cloning certain sets of states under superinformation theories 
(section 4). My exact, qualitative characterisation of unpredictability distinguishes it 
from (apparent) randomness, which, as I shall explain, requires a quantitative 
explanation.  
1.3 The appearance of stochasticity 
Another key finding of this paper is a sufficient set of conditions for 
superinformation theories to support a generalisation of the decision-theory 
approach to probability (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2012), thereby explaining the 
appearance of stochasticity. This is the property that repeated identical measurements not 
only have different unpredictable outcomes, but are also, to all appearances, random. 
Specifically, consider the frequencies of each observed outcome3 x in multiple 
measurements of a quantum observable  Xˆ  on N systems each prepared in a 
superposition or mixture ρ  of  Xˆ -eigenstates x . The appearance of stochasticity is 
that for sufficiently large N the frequencies do not differ significantly (according to 
                                                
3 In the relative-state sense (Everett, 1957). 
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some a-priori fixed statistical test) from the numbers Tr ρ x x{ }  (and equality 
occurs in the limiting case of an ensemble (see section 6)). 
To account for this, the Born Rule states that the probability that x is the outcome of 
any individual  Xˆ -measurement is Tr ρ x x{ } , thus linking, by fiat, Tr ρ x x{ }  with 
the frequencies in finite sequences of experiments. In unitary quantum theory no 
such link appears, prima facie, to exist, since all possible outcomes occur in reality. 
How can that theory be used to form an expectation about finite sequences of 
experiments, as its Born-rule-endowed counterpart can? 
The decision-theoretic approach claims to solve that problem (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 
2003, 2007, 2012; Greaves & Myrvold, 2010; Saunders, 2004, 2005). It models 
measurements as deterministic games of chance:  Xˆ  is measured on a superposition or 
mixture ρ  of  Xˆ -eigenstates; the reward is equal (in some currency) to the observed 
outcome. Thus the above problem is recast as that of how unitary quantum theory 
can inform decisions of a hypothetical rational player of that game, satisfying only 
non-probabilistic axioms of rationality. The decision-theory argument shows that the 
player, knowing unitary quantum theory (with no Born Rule) and the state ρ , 
reaches the same decision, in situations where the Born Rule would apply, as if they 
were informed by a stochastic theory with Born-Rule probabilities Tr ρ x x{ } . This 
explains how Tr ρ x x{ }  can inform expectations in single measurements under 
unitary quantum theory. One must additionally prove, from this, that unitary 
quantum theory is as testable as its Born-rule endowed counterpart (Wallace, 2012; 
Greaves & Myrvold, 2010; Deutsch, 2015).  
Thus the decision-theoretic approach claims to explain the appearance of 
stochasticity in unitary quantum theory without invoking stochastic laws, rather as 
Darwin’s theory of evolution explains the appearance of design in biological 
adaptations without invoking a designer. It has been challenged, especially in regard to 
testability (Kent, 2010; Dawid & Thébault, 2014), and defended in e.g. (Wallace, 2010; 
Greaves & Myrvold, 2010; Deutsch, 2015). Note that this work is not a defence of that 
approach; rather, it aims at clarifying and illuminating its assumptions (showing 
that most of them are physical), and at broadening its domain of applicability to 
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more general theories than quantum theory. However, a possible application of this 
result may be in investigating the physical meaning of the decision-theory argument 
in the context of the Everett interpretation. 
In my generalised version of the decision-theoretic approach, I shall define a game of 
chance under superinformation theories (section 7) and then identify a sufficient set of 
conditions for them to support decisions (under that approach) in the presence of 
unpredictability (section 6). These conditions define the class of decision-supporting 
superinformation theories (including unitary quantum theory). Specifically, they 
include conditions for superinformation theories to support the generalisation fx  of 
the numbers Tr ρ x x{ }  (section 5) corresponding to Born-rule probabilities. That is 
to say, my version of the decision-theory argument explains how the numbers fx  can 
inform decisions of a player satisfying non-probabilistic rationality axioms under 
decision-supporting superinformation theories (section 7). Thus, decision-
supporting superinformation theories would account for the appearance of 
stochasticity at least as adequately as unitary quantum theory.  
1.4 Summary of the main results  
Switching to constructor theory yields three interrelated results: 
1) The unpredictability of measurements in superinformation theories is exactly 
distinguished from the appearance of stochasticity, and proved to follow from the 
constructor-theory generalisation of the quantum no-cloning theorem (section 4).   
2) Sufficient set of conditions for superinformation theories to support the decision-
theoretic argument (see sections 5, 6, 7) are provided, defining a class of decision-
supporting superinformation theories, including unitary quantum theory. Constructor 
theory emancipates the argument from formalisms and concepts specific to 
(Everettian) quantum theory – such as ‘observed outcomes’ or ‘relative states’. 
3) Most premises of the decision-theory argument are no longer controversial 
decision-theoretic axioms, as in existing formulations, but follow from physical 
properties implied by exact principles of constructor theory.  
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In section 2 and 3 I summarise as much of constructor theory as is needed; in section 
4 I present the criterion for unpredictability; in sections 5 and 6 I give the condition for 
superinformation theories to permit the constructor-theoretic generalisation of the 
numbers fx = Tr ρ x x{ } ; in section 7, I present the decision-theory argument in 
constructor theory. 
2. Constructor Theory 
In constructor-theoretic physics the primitive notion of a ‘physical system’ is 
replaced by the slightly different notion of a substrate – a physical system some of 
whose properties can be changed by a physical transformation. Constructor theory’s 
primitive elements are tasks (as defined below), which intuitively can be thought of 
as the specifications of physical transformations affecting substrates.  Since tasks 
involving only individual states are rarely fundamental, more general descriptors 
for substrates are convenient: 
Attributes and variables. The subsidiary theory must provide a collection of states, 
attributes and variables, for any given substrate. These are physical properties of the 
substrate, and can be represented in several interrelated ways. For example, a traffic 
light is a substrate, each of whose 8 states (of three lamps, each of which can be on or 
off) is labelled by a binary string  σ r ,σa ,σ g( ) :σ i ∈ 0,1{ } ,∀i∈ r,a,g{ } , where, say, 
 σ r = 0  indicates the red lamp is off, and  σ r = 1  that it is on. Similarly for  i = a  
(amber) and  i = g  (green). Thus for instance the state where the red lamp is on and 
the others switched off is  1,0,0( ) .  
An attribute is any property of a substrate that can be formally defined as a set of all 
the states in which the substrate has that property. So for example the attribute red of 
the traffic light, denoted by r, is the set of all states in which the red lamp is on: 
 r = 1,0,0( ) , 1,1,0( ) , 1,0,1( ) , 1,1,1( ){ } . 
An intrinsic attribute is one that can be specified without referring to any other 
specific system. For example, ‘having the same colour lamp on’ is an intrinsic 
attribute of a pair of traffic lights, but ‘having the same colour lamp on as the other 
one in the pair’ is not an intrinsic attribute of either of them. In quantum theory, 
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‘being entangled with each other’ is, likewise, an intrinsic attribute of a qubit pair; 
‘having a particular density operator’ is an intrinsic attribute of a qubit, while the 
rest of its quantum state describes entanglement with other systems and so is non-
intrinsic.  
A physical variable is defined in a slightly unfamiliar way as any set of disjoint 
attributes of the same substrate. In quantum theory, this includes not only all 
observables, but many other constructs, such as any set  x ,y{ }  where x and y are the 
attributes of being in distinct non-orthogonal states  x and  y  of a quantum system. 
Whenever a substrate is in a state in an attribute  x ∈X , where X is a variable, we say 
that X is sharp (on that system), with the value x – where the x are members of the set 
X of labels4 of the attributes in X. As a shorthand, “X is sharp in a” shall mean that 
the attribute a is a subset of some attribute in X.  In the case of the traffic light, 
‘whether some lamp is on’ is the variable  P = off ,on{ } , where I have introduced the 
attributes  off = 0,0,0( ){ }  and  on , which contains all the states where at least one 
lamp is on. So, when the traffic light is, say, in the state  1,0,0( )  where only the red 
lamp is on, we say that “P is sharp with value on”. Also, we say that P is sharp in the 
attribute r (red, defined above), with value on – which means that  r ⊆ on . In 
quantum theory, the z-component-of-spin variable of a spin-½ particle is the set of 
two attributes: that of the z-component of the spin being ½, and -½. That variable is 
sharp when the qubit is in a pure state with spin ½ or -½ in the z-direction, and is 
non-sharp otherwise. 
Tasks. A task is the abstract specification of a physical transformation on a substrate, 
which is transformed from having some physical attribute to having another. It is 
                                                
4 I shall always define symbols explicitly in their contexts, but for added clarity I use the convention: Small Greek 
letters (γρά%%ατα) denote states; small italic boldface denotes attributes; CAPITAL ITALIC BOLDFACE 
denotes variables; small italic denotes labels; CAPITAL ITALIC denotes sets of labels; CAPITAL BOLDFACE 
denotes physical systems; and capital letters with arrow above (e.g.  
!
C ) denote constructors.  
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expressed as a set of ordered pairs of input/output attributes  xi → yi  of the substrates. I 
shall represent it as5: 
 
A = {x
1
→ y
1
, x
2
→ y
2
,...} . 
The  xi{ }  are the legitimate input attributes, the  yi{ }  are the output attributes. A 
constructor for the task  A  is defined as a physical system that would cause  A  to 
occur on the substrates and would remain unchanged in its ability to cause that again. 
Schematically: 
!Input!attribute!of!substrates
Constructor⎯ →⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ Output!attribute!of!substrates  
where constructor and substrates jointly are isolated.  This scheme draws upon two 
primitive notions that must be given physical meanings by the subsidiary theories, 
namely: the substrates with the input attribute are presented to the constructor, which 
delivers the substrates with the output attribute. A constructor is capable of performing 
 A  if, whenever presented with the substrates with a legitimate input attribute of   A  
(i.e., in any state in that attribute) it delivers them in some state in one of the 
corresponding output attributes, regardless of how it acts on the substrate with any 
other attribute. A task on the traffic light substrate is  on→ off{ } ; and a constructor 
for it is a device that must switch off all its lamps whenever presented when any of 
the states in on. In the case of the task  off → on{ } it is enough that, when the traffic 
light as a whole is switched off (in the state  0,0,0( ) ), it delivers some state in the 
attribute on – say by switching on the red lamp only, delivering the state  1,0,0( )  – 
not necessarily all of them.  
The fundamental principle. A task  T  is impossible if there is a law of physics that 
forbids its being carried out with arbitrary accuracy and reliability by a constructor. 
Otherwise,  T  is possible, which I shall denote by  T✓ . This means that a constructor 
capable of performing  T  can be physically realised with arbitrary accuracy and 
                                                
5 This ‘→ ’ notation for ordered pairs is intended to bring out the notion of transformation inherent in a task.  
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reliability (short of perfection). Catalysts and computers are familiar examples of 
approximations to constructors. So, ‘ T  is possible’ means that it can be brought about 
with arbitrary accuracy, but it does not imply that it will happen, since it does not imply 
that a constructor for it will ever be built and presented with the right substrate. 
Conversely, a prediction that  T  will happen with some probability would not 
imply  T ’s possibility: that ‘rolling a seven’ sometimes happens when shooting dice 
does not imply that the task ‘roll a seven under the rules of that game’ can be 
performed with arbitrarily high accuracy.  
Non-probabilistic, counterfactual properties – i.e. about what does not happen, but could – 
are the centrepiece of constructor theory’s mode of explanation, as expressed by its 
fundamental principle: 
I. All (other) laws of physics are expressible solely in terms of statements about 
which tasks are possible, which are impossible, and why.  
The radically different mode of explanation employed by this principle permits the 
formulation of new laws of physics (e.g. constructor information theory’s ones). Thus 
constructor theory differs in motivation and content from existing operational 
frameworks, such as resource theory (Coecke, Fritz & Spekkens, 2014). The latter aims 
at proving theorems following from subsidiary theories, allowing their formal 
properties to be expressed in a unified resource-theoretic formalism. Constructor 
theory, in contrast, proposes new principles, not derivable from subsidiary theories, to 
supplement them, elucidate their physical meaning, and impose severe restrictions 
ruling out some of them.  
As remarked, a constructor is closely related to the notion of a chemical catalyst, as 
recently formalised, e.g. in resource theory (Fritz, 2015). A constructor is 
distinguished among generic catalyst-type objects in that it is required to be capable 
of performing the task reliably, repeatedly and to arbitrarily high accuracy. So it is 
not itself a physical object, but a manner of speaking about an infinite sequence of 
possible physical objects that would perform the task approximately. 
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Hence principle I requires subsidiary theories to have two crucial properties 
(holding in unitary quantum theory): (i) They must support a topology over the set 
of physical processes they apply to, which gives a meaning to a sequence of 
approximate constructions, converging to an exact performance of  T ; (ii) They must 
be non-probabilistic – since they must be expressed exclusively as statements about 
possible/impossible tasks. For instance, the Born-Rule-endowed versions of 
quantum theory, being probabilistic, do not obey the principle. 
Principle of Locality. I shall denote the combination of two substrates !S1  and !S2  by 
!S1⊕S2 . Constructor theory requires all subsidiary theories to provide the following 
support for the concept of such a combination. First, !S1⊕S2  is a substrate. Second, if 
subsidiary theories designate any task as possible which has !S1⊕S2  as input 
substrate, they must provide a meaning for presenting !S1  and !S2  to the relevant 
constructor as the substrate !S1⊕S2 . Third, and most importantly, they must 
conform to Einstein’s (1949) principle of locality in the form:  
II. There exists a mode of description such that the state of !S1⊕S2  is the pair 
 (ξ,ζ)  of the states6 ξ  of !S1  and ζ  of !S2 , and any construction undergone by 
!S1  and not !S2  can change only ξ  and not ζ .  
Unitary quantum theory satisfies II, as is explicit in the Heisenberg picture (Deutsch 
& Hayden, 2000; Raymond-Robichaud & Brassard 2016). In that picture, the state of 
a quantum system is, at any one time, a minimal set of generators for the algebra of 
observables of that system, plus the Heisenberg state (Horsman & Vedral, 2007; 
Gottesman, 1999). Since the latter never changes, it can be abstracted away when 
specifying tasks: any residual ‘non-locality’ in that state (Wallace & Timpson, 2007) 
does not prevent quantum theory from satisfying principle II.  
The parallel composition  A⊗ B  of two tasks  A  and  B  is the task whose net effect on a 
substrate  M⊕N  is that of performing  A  on M and  B  on N. When  A⊗T  is 
                                                
6 In which case the same must hold for intrinsic attributes. 
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possible for some task  T  on some generic, naturally occurring substrate (as defined 
in Deutsch & Marletto, 2015),  A  is possible with side-effects, which is written  A✓ . ( T  
represents the side-effect.) 
3. Constructor theory of information 
I shall now summarise the principles of the constructor theory of information (Deutsch 
& Marletto, 2015). The principles express exactly the properties required of physical 
laws by theories of (classical) information, computation and communication – such 
as the possibility of copying – as well as the exact relation between what has been 
called informally ‘quantum information’ and ‘classical information’.7  
First, one defines computation media.8 A computation medium with computation variable 
V (at least two of whose attributes have labels in a set V) is a substrate on which the 
task  Π V( )  of performing a permutation Π  defined via the labels V 
 
Π V( ) ! {
x∈V
∪ x→Π(x)}  
is possible (with or without side effects), for all Π .  Π V( )  is a reversible computation9. 
Information media are computation media on which additional tasks are possible. 
Specifically, a variable X is clonable if for some attribute  x0  of S the computation on 
the composite system !S⊕S   
 
 
x ,x
0( )→ x ,x( ){ }
x∈X
∪ ,  (1) 
                                                
7 Thus, even though it is not itself an attempt to axiomatise quantum theory, it could provide physical 
foundations for information-based axiomatisations of quantum theory, (e.g. Clifton, Bub & Halvorson, 2003; 
Chiribella, D’Ariano & Perinotti, 2011), wherein ‘information’ is merely assumed to be a primitive, never 
explained). 
8 This is just a label for the physical systems with the given definition. Crucially, it entails no reliance on any a-
priori notion of computation (such as Turing-computability). 
9 This is a logically reversible, (i.e., one-to-one) task, while the process implementing it may be physically 
irreversible, because of side-effects. 
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namely cloning X, is possible (with or without side-effects)10. An information medium 
is a substrate with at least one clonable computation variable, called an information 
variable (whose attributes are called information attributes). For instance, a qubit is a 
computation medium with any set of two pure states, even if they are not orthogonal 
(Deutsch & Marletto, 2015); with a set of two orthogonal states it is an information 
medium. Information media must also obey the principles of constructor 
information theory, which I shall now recall. 
Interoperability. Let  X1  and  X2  be variables of substrates  S1  and  S2  respectively, 
and  X1 × X2  be the variable of the composite substrate  S1⊕S2  whose attributes are 
labelled by the ordered pair  (x,x ')∈X1 ×X2 , where  X1  and  X2  are the sets of labels 
of  X1  and  X2  respectively, and ×  denotes the Cartesian product of sets. The 
interoperability principle is elegantly expressed as a constraint on the composite 
system of information media (and on their information variables): 
III. The combination of two information media with information variables  X1  and 
 X2  is an information medium with information variable  X1 × X2 . 
Distinguishing and measuring are expressed exactly in constructor theory as tasks 
involving information variables – without reference to any a priori notion of 
information. A variable X of a substrate S is distinguishable if 
 
 
x → ix{ }
x∈X
∪⎛⎝
⎞
⎠
✓   (2) 
                                                
10 The usual notion of cloning, as in the no-cloning theorem (Wootters & Zurek, 1982), is (1) with X as the set of 
all attributes of S.   
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where  {ix }  is an information variable (whereby  ix ∩ ix' = o  if  x = x '  ). I write  x ⊥ y  if 
 x ,y{ }  is a distinguishable variable. Information variables themselves are 
distinguishable, by the interoperability principle III.11  
A variable X is measurable if a special case of the distinguishing task (2) is possible 
(with or without side-effects) – namely, when the original source substrate continues 
to exist12 in some attribute  yx  and the result is stored in a target substrate: 
 
 
x ,x0( )→ yx ,‘x’( ){ }
x∈X
∪⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
✓
  (3) 
where  x0  is a generic, ‘receptive’ attribute and  ‘X ’ = ‘x’ : x∈X{ }  is an information 
variable of the target substrate, which I shall call the output variable (which may, but 
need not, contain  x0 ). When X is sharp on the source with any value x, the target is 
changed to having the information attribute  ‘x’ , meaning 《S had attribute x》.  
A measurer of X is any constructor capable of performing the task (3) for some choice of 
its output variable, labelling, and receptive state.13 Thus, it is also is a measurer of 
other variables: For example, it measures any subset of X, or any coarsening of X (a 
variable whose members are unions of attributes in X). Two notable coarsenings of 
 X1 × X2  are:  X1 + X2 , where the attributes  x1 ,x2( )  are re-labelled with numbers 
 x1 + x2  (and combined accordingly), and  X1X2 , where the attributes  x1 ,x2( )  are re-
labelled with numbers  x1x2  (and likewise combined). I shall consider only non-
perturbing measurements, i.e.,  yx ⊆ x  in (3). Whenever the output variable is 
guaranteed to be sharp with a value ‘x’, I shall say, with a slight abuse of 
terminology, that the measurer of X “delivers a sharp output ‘x’”. 
                                                
11The set of any two non-orthogonal quantum states is not a distinguishable variable. In quantum theory two 
such states on ensembles are asymptotically distinguishable. This is generalised in constructor theory via the 
ensemble-distinguishability principle, which, in short, requires any two disjoint information attributes to be 
ensemble-distinguishable (Deutsch & Marletto, 2015). 
12 Quantum observables that are usually measured destructively, e.g. polarisation, qualify as measurable in this 
sense, provided that measuring them non-destructively is possible in principle.  
13 This differs from laboratory practice, where a measurer of X is assigned some convenient, fixed labelling of its 
output states. 
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The ‘bar’ operation. Given an information attribute  x , define the attribute  x  (‘x-
bar’) as the union 
 
a
a : a⊥x
∪  of all attributes that are distinguishable from x. With this 
useful tool one can construct a Boolean information variable, defined as  x ,x{ }  (which, 
as explained below, allows one to generalise quantum projectors). Also, for any 
variable X, define the attribute 
 
uX ! x
x∈X
∪ .  The attribute  uX  is the constructor-
theoretic generalisation of the quantum notion of the subspace spanned by a set of 
states. For example, consider an information variable  X = 0 ,1{ }  where  0  and  1  are 
the attributes of being in particular eigenstates of a non-degenerate quantum 
observable  Xˆ  (which also has other eigenstates). Then,  uX  is the attribute of being in 
any of the possible superpositions and mixtures (prepared by any possible 
preparation14) of those two eigenstates of  Xˆ .  
Consistency of measurement. In quantum theory repeated measurements of 
physical properties are consistent in the following sense. Consider the variable 
 X = 0 ,1{ }  defined above. Let 2 be the attribute of being in a particular eigenstate of 
 Xˆ  orthogonal to both 0 and 1. All measurers of the variable  Z = uX ,2{ }  are then also 
measurers of the variable  Z' = uX ,2{ } , so that all measurers of the former, when 
given any attribute  a⊆ uX , will give the same sharp output  ‘uX ’ . The principle of 
consistency of measurement requires all subsidiary theories to have this property: 
IV. Whenever a measurer of a variable Z would deliver a sharp output when 
presented with an attribute  a⊆ uZ , all other measurers of Z would too.  
It follows (Deutsch & Marletto 2015) that they would all deliver the same sharp 
output.  
Observables. Since (from the definition of ‘bar’)  x ≡ x , attributes x with  x = x  have 
a useful property, whence the following constructor-theoretic generalisation of 
quantum information observables: An information observable X is an information 
                                                
14 In any local formalism for quantum theory, such as the Heisenberg picture, there are many states, differently 
prepared, with different local descriptors, that have the same density matrix. 
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variable such that whenever a measurer of X delivers a sharp output  ‘x’  the input substrate 
really has the attribute x.15 A necessary and sufficient condition for a variable to be 
an observable is that  x = x  for all its attributes x (Deutsch & Marletto, 2015). For 
example, the above-defined variable  Z = uX ,2{ }  is not an observable (a Z-measurer 
delivers a sharp output  ‘uX ’  even when presented with a state  ξ ∈uX \uX , where ‘\’ 
denotes set exclusion), but  uX ,2{ }  is.  
Superinformation media. A superinformation medium S is an information medium 
with at least two information observables, X and Y,  that contain only mutually 
disjoint attributes and whose union is not an information observable. Y and X are called 
complementary observables. For example, in quantum physics any set of two 
orthogonal qubit states constitutes an information observable, but no union of two 
or more such sets does: its members are not all distinguishable. Superinformation 
theories are subsidiary theories obeying constructor theory and permitting 
superinformation media. 
From that simple property it follows that superinformation media exhibit all the 
most distinctive properties of quantum systems (Deutsch & Marletto, 2015). In 
particular, the attributes y in Y are the constructor-theoretic generalisations of what 
in quantum theory is called “being in a superposition or mixture” of states in the 
complementary observable X.  
Generalised mixtures. Consider an attribute  y ∈Y  and define the observable 
 
Xy ! x ∈X : x ⊥ y{ } . (In quantum theory X could be the photon-number observable  
in some cavity,  1 1 + 2 2 2 +… , and y the attribute of being in some superposition 
or mixture of some of its eigenstates, e.g. 
1
2 0 + 1( ) . In that case  Xy  would contain 
two attributes, namely those of being in the states  0 0  and  1 1  respectively.) One 
proves (Deutsch & Marletto, 2015) that: 
                                                
15 “Delivering a sharp output ‘x’” means that, according to the subsidiary theory, the output variable ‘X’ will be, 
objectively, sharp with value ‘x’; not (say) that the outcome ‘x’ is ‘observed in some universe’.  
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1) X is non-sharp in y since  x∩ y = o ,∀x∈X  (where ‘ o ’ denotes the empty set), and 
 Xy  contains at least two attributes.  
2) Some coarsenings of X are sharp in y, just as in quantum theory – where the state 
 
1
2 0 + 1( )  is in the +1-eigenspace of the projector  0 0 + 1 1 . The observable 
 uXy ,uXy{ } , 
 
uXy = x
x∈Xy
∪ , is the constructor-theoretic generalisation of such a projector, 
and it is shown to be sharp in y, with value  uXy . Like in quantum theory, any 
measurer of X presented with y, followed by a computation whose output is 
«whether the outcome was one of the ‘x’ with  x ⊥ y », will provide a sharp output 
 ‘uXy ’ , corresponding to «yes». (Here and throughout, I adopt the convention that a 
‘quoted’ attribute is the one that would be delivered by a measurement of the un-
quoted one, with suitable labelling – and likewise for variables.) In summary: 
 
∀x∈X , x y = 1
Xy! x∈X : x y ≠ 0{ }  has at least two elements }
y  is an eigenstate of an observable Yˆ with [Xˆ,Yˆ]= 0
Quantum Theory
⇔
y∩ x = o
Xy = x ∈X : x ⊥ y{ }  has at least two elements{
y ∈Y ;Y is complementary to X
Constructor Theory
Pˆ ! x x
x∈Xy
∑ ⇔ P ! uXy ,uXy{ }
Tr Pˆ y y( ) = 1 ⇔ y ⊆ uXy
 
For any observable  H = h1 ,…hn{ } , I call an information variable z a generalised 
mixture of (the attributes in)  H  if either z is in H (then it is a trivial mixture) or 
 ∀hi ∈H( ) z∩hi = o & z ⊥ hi( )  and  uH ,uH{ }  is sharp in z with value  uH . (In 
quantum theory, the  hi  could be attributes of being eigenstates of some non-
degenerate quantum observable, and a generalised mixture of those attributes 
would be a quantum superposition or mixture of those eigenstates.)  
3) Let  (ay ,by)  be the attribute
16 delivered by an X-measurer (with substrates  Sa ⊕Sb ), 
when presented with y (figure 1). (In quantum theory,  (ay ,by)  could be an entangled 
                                                
16 It is a pair of attributes by locality: in quantum theory, for a fixed Heisenberg state, that is a pair of sets of local 
descriptors, generators of the algebra of observables for  Sa  and  Sb  (Gottesman, 1999; Horsman & Vedral, 2010). 
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state resulting from a measurement of X, where y was the state  
1
2 0 + 1( ) .) One can 
show that each of the local descriptors  ay  and by  has the same properties 1) and 2) as 
y does, as follows:  
Let 
 
‘X ’y ! ‘x’∈‘X ’ : x ∈Xy{ }   (i)  ‘X ’y  is not sharp in  by . (If it 
were, with value ‘x’, that would imply, via the property of 
observables, that  y ⊆ x , contrary to the defining property that 
 x∩ y = o .) (ii) Also,  by ⊥ ‘x’,  ∀‘x’∈‘X ’y  (for if  by ⊥ ‘x’ , then y 
could be distinguished from x, contrary to assumption). (iii) 
 by ⊆ u‘X ’y . For a measurer of  u‘X ’y ,u‘X ’y{ }  applied to the target 
substrate of an X-measurer is also a measurer of  uXy ,uXy{ } ; hence, when presented 
with y, it must deliver a sharp output  ‘u‘X ’y ’ . By the property of observables, 
 u‘X ’y ,u‘X ’y{ }  must be sharp in  by , with value  u‘X ’y . By the same argument, one shows 
that  Xy  is not sharp in  ay , i.e.  ay ∩ x = o ; that  ay ⊥ x , ∀x ∈Xy ; and that  uXy ,uXy{ }  
is sharp in  ay , with value  uXy .  
Intrinsic parts of attributes. The attributes  ay  and  by  are not intrinsic, for each 
depends on the history of interactions with other systems. (In quantum theory,  Sa  
and  Sb  are entangled.) However, because of the principle of locality, given an 
information observable X, one can define the X-intrinsic part  ay[ ]X  of the attribute  ay  
as follows. Consider the attribute  (ay ,by)  prepared by measuring X on system  Sa  
using some particular substrate  Sb  as the target substrate.  In each such preparation, 
 Sa  will have the same intrinsic attribute  ay[ ]X , which I shall call the X-intrinsic part 
of  ay , which is therefore the union of all the attributes preparable in that way. The same 
construction defines the ‘X’-intrinsic part  by[ ]'X'  of  by .  
It follows, from the corresponding property of  ay : That  uXy ,uXy{ }  is sharp in 
 ay[ ]X with value  uXy ; that  ay[ ]X ∩ x = φ ; That  ay[ ]X ⊥ x ,  ∀x ∈Xy . Similarly for the 
‘quoted’ variables and attributes. In quantum theory,  ay[ ]X  and  by[ ]'X'  are attributes 
of having the reduced density matrices on  Sa  and  Sb . Unlike in (Zurek, 2005), they 
are not given any probabilistic interpretation, but only used as local descriptors of 
Figure 1 
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locally accessible information (defined deterministically in constructor theory 
(Deutsch & Marletto, 2015)).  
Successive measurements. In unitary quantum theory the consistency of 
measurement (see above) is the feature that when successive measurers of  Xˆ  are 
applied to the same source initially in the state  α 0 +β 1( ) , with two systems  Sb  
and  Sb'  as targets:   
 
α 0 a +β 1 a( ) 0 b 0 b ' →α 0 a 0 b 0 b '!"# $# +β 1 a 1 b 1 b '!"# $#   
the projector for «whether the two target substrates hold the same value» is sharp 
with value 1. In constructor theory the generalisation of that property is required to 
hold. Define a useful device, the X-comparer17  C
!"
X .  It is a constructor for the task of 
comparing two instances of a substrate in regard to an observable X defined on each: 
 
x ,x' ,x0( )→ x ,x' ,cx,x'( ){ }
x ,x'∈X
∪
  
(4) 
where  cx,x' = «yes»  if x=x’ (i.e. if the first two substrates (sources) hold attributes with 
the same label) and  cx,x' = «no»  otherwise.  «yes»,«no»{ }  is an information 
observable of a third substrate (target). In quantum theory if  Xˆ  has eigenstates  x{ } , 
 C
!"
X  is realised by a unitary that delivers  «yes»  (respectively  «no» ) whenever the 
state of the sources is in 
 
Span
x∈X
x x{ }  or a mixture thereof (respectively 
 
Span
x ',x∈X:x≠x '
x x '{ } ). The equivalent holds under constructor theory, by the principle of 
consistency of measurement IV:  C
!"
X  delivers the output  «yes»  if and only if the 
sources hold an attribute in 
 
(x ,x){ }
x∈X
∪ . Thus, in particular, if one of the sources has 
the attribute x then  C
!"
X  is a measurer of  x ,x{ } , i.e. of whether the other source also 
has the attribute x (a property used in section 4). 
                                                
17 X is non-bold (denoting a set of labels) in order to stress that its task is not invariant under re-labelling. 
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The fact that a quantum  C
!"
X  would deliver a sharp  «yes»  
when presented with the target substrates of successive 
measurements of an observable on the same source, is 
what makes ‘relative states’ and ‘universes’ meaningful in 
Everettian quantum theory, because it makes the notion of 
‘observed outcome in a universe’ meaningful even when 
the input variable X of the measurer is not sharp. The 
same holds in superinformation theories (figure 2). 
4. Unpredictability in superinformation media 
Having presented the necessary parts of constructor information theory, I can now 
discuss unpredictability. I shall define it exactly in constructor theory, and show 
how it arises in superinformation media. 
X-predictor. An X-predictor for the output of an X-measurer whose input attribute z 
is drawn from some variable Z 
(in short: ‘X-predictor for Z’), is a 
constructor for the task: 
 
sz ,x0( )→ sz ,pz( ){ }
z∈Z
∪  
where  P = pz{ } is an information 
observable whose attributes pZ – each representing the prediction  « the outcome of the 
X-measurer will be ‘x’ given the attribute z as input »  – are required to satisfy the 
network of constructions in figure 3.  
!
B  first prepares  Sa  with the information 
attribute  z∈Z  specified by some information attribute  sz ; then the X-measurer  
!
M
X  
is applied to  Sa ; and then its target  Sb and the output of the predictor,  pz , are 
presented to an ‘X’-comparer  
!
C‘X ’ . If that delivers a sharp  «yes» , the prediction  pz  
is confirmed. If it would be confirmed for all  z∈Z , then  
!
PX  is an X-predictor for Z. 
The exact definition of unpredictability is then: 
Figure 2 Consistency of 
repeated measurements. 
Figure 3 The scheme defining an X-predictor  
!
PX  
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A substrate exhibits unpredictability if, for some observable X, there is a variable Z 
such that an X-predictor for Z is impossible  
Hence unpredictability is the impossibility of an X-predictor for a variable Z. Note the 
similarity to ‘no-cloning’, i.e., the impossibility of a constructor for the cloning task (2) 
on the variable Z.  
No-cloning implies unpredictability. Indeed, I shall now show that 
superinformation theories (and thus unitary quantum theory) exhibit 
unpredictability as a consequence of the impossibility of cloning certain sets of 
attributes.  
Consider two complementary observables X and Y of a superinformation medium 
and define the variable  Z = Xy ∪ y{ } . I show that there cannot be an X-predictor for Z. 
For suppose there were. The predictor’s output information observable P would 
have to include the observable  ‘X ’y . For, if z=x for some  x ∈Xy ,  ‘X ’y  has to be 
sharp on the target  Sb of the measurer with value ‘x’; so the ‘X’-comparer yielding a 
sharp  «yes»  would require  px = 'x'  (as explained in section 3,  C'X ' is a measurer of 
 
'x' ,'x'{ }  when  ‘X ’  is sharp on one of its sources with value ‘x’). 
When z=y, the X-predictor’s output attribute  py  must still cause the X-comparer to 
output the sharp outcome  «yes» ; also,  P = ‘X ’y ∪ py{ }  is required to be an 
information variable: hence either  py = 'x'  for some 'x' ∈‘X’y ; or  
'x' ∈u
‘X’y
. In the 
former case, again by considering  C'X '  as a measurer of  
'x' ,'x'{ } ,  ‘X ’y  would have to 
be sharp on the target  Sb  of the X-measurer, with the value ‘x’; whence  y ⊆ x , 
contrary to definition of superinformation.  In the latter, since  y ⊂ uXy ,  Sb would 
have the attribute  u'X'y  (section 3) so that the ‘X’-comparer would have to output a 
sharp  «no» . This again contradicts the assumptions. So, there cannot exist an X-
predictor for Z, just as there cannot be a cloner for Z, because Z is not an information 
variable.  
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Thus, unpredictability is predicted by the superinformation theory’s deterministic18 
laws. Its physical explanation is given by the subsidiary theory. In Everettian quantum 
theory it is that there are different ‘observed outcomes’ across the multiverse. But 
constructor theory has emancipated unpredictability from ‘observers’, ‘relative 
states’ and ‘universes’, stating it as a qualitative information-theoretic property, just 
as no-cloning is.  
5. X-indistinguishability equivalence classes 
Quantum systems exhibit the appearance of stochasticity, which is more than mere 
unpredictability. Consider a quantum observable  Xˆ  of a d-dimensional system S, 
with eigenstates  x  and eigenvalues  x . Successive measurements of  Xˆ  on N instances 
of S, each identically prepared in a superposition or mixture ρ  of  Xˆ -eigenstates, 
display the following convergence property: i) For large N, the fraction of replicas 
delivering the observed outcome19  ‘x’ when  Xˆ  is measured can be expected not to differ 
significantly (according to some a-priori fixed statistical test) from the number 
Tr ρ x x{ } ; ii) in an ensemble (infinite collection) of such replicas, each prepared in 
state ρ  (a “ρ -ensemble”, for brevity), the fraction of instances that would give rise to 
an observed outcome ‘x’ equals Tr ρ x x{ }   (DeWitt, 1970).  
But what justifies the expectation in i)? A frequentist approach to probability would 
simply postulate that the number Tr ρ x x{ }  from ii) is the ‘probability’ of the 
outcome x when  Xˆ  is measured on ρ  – which would imply (via ad-hoc 
methodological rules, see e.g. (Papineau, 2006; and Deutsch, 2015)) that Tr ρ x x{ }  
could inform decisions about finitely many measurements. In contrast, in unitary 
quantum theory, it is the decision-theoretic approach that establishes the same 
conclusion – with no ad-hoc probabilistic assumption. Absent that argument, the 
numbers Tr ρ x x{ }  are just labels of equivalence classes within the set of 
                                                
18This is so even if the initial conditions are specified with perfect accuracy in contrast with classical ‘chaos’. 
19 Constructor theory’s consistency of successive measurements (section 3), i.e. relative states in quantum theory, 
make the concept of observed outcome accurate for some purposes despite the lack of a single observed 
outcome. 
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superpositions and mixtures of the states  x{ } . Each class, labelled by the d-tuple 
fx[ ]x∈X ,  0 ≤ fx ≤ 1 ,  
fx = 1
x∈X
∑ , is the set of all states ρ  with Tr ρ x x{ } = fx . For 
instance,  c0 0 + e
iφc1 1  belongs to the class labelled by  c0
2 , c1
2⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ . 
I shall now give sufficient conditions on superinformation theories for a 
generalisation of those equivalence classes, which I shall call ‘X-indistinguishability 
classes’, to exist on the set of all generalised mixtures of attributes of a given 
observable X. One of the conditions for a superinformation theory to support the 
decision-theoretic argument will be that they allow for such classes (section 6). 
In quantum theory, the equivalence classes are labelled by the d-tuple fx[ ]x∈X , where 
fx = Tr ρ x x{ } . Since the ‘trace’ operator need not be available in superinformation 
theories, to the end of constructing such equivalence classes I shall deploy a 
construction on fictitious ensembles. This is a novel mathematical construction, where 
properties of ensemble will be used to define properties of single systems without, of 
course, any probabilistic or frequentist interpretation.  
At this stage, the  fx  are only labels of equivalence classes. Additional conditions will 
therefore be needed for the  fx  to inform decisions in the way that probabilities are 
assumed to do in stochastic theories (including traditional quantum theory via the 
Born Rule). I shall give these in section 7 via the decision-theory argument. No 
conclusion about decisions could possibly follow merely from what the results of 
measurements on an infinite ensemble would be, which is what my formal definition 
of the  fx  is about. 
X-indistinguishability classes. I denote by  S N( ) a substrate  S⊕S⊕…S
N  instances! "# $#
, consisting of 
N replicas of a substrate S. Let us fix an observable X of S, whose attributes I 
suppose with no relevant loss of generality to be labelled by integers:  X = x : x∈X{ } , 
where  X = 0,1,....,d −1{ } . Let  X
(N) ! (x1 ,x2 ,x3 ,...,xN ) : xi ∈X{ }  be the set of strings of 
length N whose digits can take values in  X , each denoted by 
 s ! (s1 ,s2 ,s3 ,...,sN ) : si ∈X .  X
(N) = s : s∈X(N){ }  is an observable of  S N( ) . In quantum 
theory, supposing that  Xˆ  is an observable of a d-dimensional system S,  X(N)  might 
Chiara Marletto Constructor Theory of Probability 
 
 25 
 
be  Xˆ(N) = Xˆ1 + dXˆ2 + d2Xˆ3 + ...+ dN−1XˆN , whose non-degenerate eigenstates are the 
strings of length N:  s ! s1 s2 ... sN si ∈X .  
Fix an N. For any attribute x in X, I define a constructor  
!
Dx( N)  for the task of 
counting the number of replicas that hold a sharp value x of X:  
 
s→ f(x ;s){ }
s∈X ( N )
∪  
where the numbers 
 
f (x;s) ! 1N δx ,sisi∈s
∑ label the attributes of the output information 
variable  O
(N) = o(N) : o∈Φ(N){ } , with  Φ
(N) = fi(N){ }  denoting the set of fractions with 
denominator N: 
 
fi(N) !
i
N . Thus, 
whenever presented with the substrate 
 S N( )  on which  X (N)  is sharp with value  s  
(i.e.,  S N( )  is in a state  ξ ∈s ),  
!
Dx( N)  
outputs the number of instances of S on 
which X is sharp with value x.  It could 
be realised, for instance, by measuring the 
observable ‘X’ on each of the N substrates in  S N( ) , and then by adding one unit to the 
output substrate, initially at 0, for each ‘x’ detected (figure 4). In quantum theory it 
effects a unitary operation defined by: 
  U : s x0 → s f (x;s) ,∀s   
I shall now use  
!
Dx( N)  to define attributes of the substrate  S(N) , whose limiting case for 
 N→∞  will be used to define the X-indistinguishability classes.  
Consider first the observable 
 
Xx , fi( N ) ! s∈X
(N) : f (x,s) = fi(N){ }  containing the strings 
 s  where a fraction  fi
(N) ∈Φ(N)  of the replicas of S hold a sharp attribute x. They have 
the property that when presented to  
!
Dx( N)  they make the observable  O(N)  sharp in 
output, with value  fi
(N) . For example, for N=3 and  x = 0 ,  Φ
(3) = 0, 13 , 23 ,1{ }  and  X0 ,2/3  
contains the quantum states  001 , 010 , 100{ } . Now define the attribute  x fi( N )  as the 
union of all the attributes  z(N) of  S
(N)  that when presented to  
!
Dx( N)  make the observable  O(N)  
sharp in output, with value  fi
(N) . Next, consider the observable 
Figure 4. The constructor 
 
!
Dx(N ) .  
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F(x) (N) ! x fi( N ) : fi
(N) ∈Φ(N){ } . It follows from the consistency of measurement (section 
3): 
 
 
x fi( N ) = uX
fi( N )
. 
Therefore, crucially, for a given x,  F(x) (N) can be sharp even if the observable  X (N)  is 
not. In the example above, for N=3 and  x = 0 ,  02/3 ∈F(0)
( 3)  is the set of all 
superpositions and mixtures of the eigenstates of  Xˆ (3 )  contained in  X0 ,2/3 , 
 001 , 010 , 100{ } :  Xˆ (3 )  is not sharp in most such mixtures and superpositions.  
The observable  F(x) (N)  is key to generalising quantum theory’s convergence 
property, for the latter is due to the fact that there exists the limit of the sequence of 
attributes  x fi( N )  for  N→∞ . Let me now recall the formal expression of the 
convergence property in quantum theory (DeWitt, 1970)20: 
Consider a state 
 
z = cx x
x∈X
∑  with the property that 
 
z ⊗N = cs1cs2 ...csN s
s
∑  is a 
superposition of states  s = s1 s2 ... sN si ∈X  each having a different  f (x;s) = fi
(N) . 
The convergence property is that for any positive, arbitrarily small ε : 
 
 
z ⊗N →
N→∞
cs1cs2 ...csN s
s:δ(s)≤ε
∑   
where 
 
δ(s) = ( f (x;s) − cx
2 )
x∈X
∑
2
. In other words, for any arbitrarily small ε , there exists 
an N such that the quantum implementation of  
!
Dx( N) , when asked whether the 
fraction  f (x;s)  of observed outcomes ‘x’ obtained when measuring  Xˆ
(N)  on  z
⊗N  is 
within ε  of the value cx
2 , is in a state as close (in the natural Hilbert space norm 
provided by quantum theory) as desired to one in which it answers  «yes» . Thus the 
proportion of instances delivering the observed outcome ‘x’ when  Xˆ  is measured on 
                                                
20 My appealing to that property is not to conclude, using DeWitt’s own words, that the “conventional statistical 
interpretation of quantum mechanics thus emerges from the formalism itself” (which would be circular); I shall 
only use it formally to construct certain attributes of the single substrate. 
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the ensemble state  z
∞ = lim
N→∞
z ⊗N  is equal to Tr ρz x x{ } = cx 2 (where  ρz ! z z ). 
Therefore, all states  z
⊗N  with the property Tr ρz x x{ } =| cx |2 will be grouped by 
 
!
Dx( N)  in the same set, as N tends to infinity, which can thus be labelled by 
Tr ρz x x{ } . This set is an attribute of a single system, containing all quantum states 
with the property that Tr ρz x x{ } =| cx |2= fx . The set of all superpositions and 
mixtures of eigenstates of X is thus partitioned equivalence classes, labelled by the d-
tuple fx[ ]x∈X ,  0 ≤ fx ≤ 1 ,  
fx = 1
x∈X
∑ . 
A sufficient condition on a superinformation theory for a generalisation of these ‘X-
indistinguishability classes’ to exist under it, on the set of all generalised mixtures of 
attributes of a given observable X, is that it satisfy the following requirements: 
E1)  For each  x fi( N ) ∈F(x)
(N) , there exists the attribute of the ensemble of 
replicas of S defined as 
 
 
x f ∞ ! limN→∞x fi( N ) ,   
where f
∞ = lim
N→∞
fi(N) ∈Φ ; Φ  is the limiting set of  Φ(N)  - which must 
exist, and its elements, which are real numbers, must have the property 
 
f ∞ = 1,  0 ≤ f ∞ ≤ 1
f ∞∈Φ
∑ .  
The existence of the limit implies that those attributes do not intersect, i.e., the set 
 F(x)
(∞) = x f ∞ : f ∞ ∈Φ{ }  is a (formal) variable of the ensemble – a limiting case of 
 F(x) (N) , generalising its quantum analogue. 
Given an attribute z of S, define  z
(N) ! z,z,…z( )
N terms" #$ %$
, (in quantum theory, this is the 
attribute of being in the quantum state  z
⊗N ); introduce the auxiliary variable 
 
X f ∞ ! z : limN→∞z
(N) ⊆ x f ∞{ }  and let 
 
x f ∞ ! z
z∈X
f∞
∪  – which, unlike its ensemble counterpart 
 x f ∞ , is an attribute of a single substrate S.  
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E2) For any generalised mixture z of the attributes in X, there exists a d-tuple 
 f (z)x⎡⎣ ⎤⎦x∈X  with  
f (z)x = 1
x∈X
∑ ,  0 ≤ f (z)x ≤ 1 , such that 
 
z⊆ x f( z)x
x∈X
∩ . I shall 
call  f (z)x⎡⎣ ⎤⎦x∈X the X-partition of unity for the attribute z. 
21 
If z has such a partition of unity, it must be unique because of E1). An X-
indistinguishability equivalence class is defined as the set of all attributes with the same 
X-partition of unity: any two attributes within that class cannot be distinguished by 
measuring only the observable X on each individual substrate, even in the limit of an 
infinite ensemble. In quantum theory,  x f  contains all states ρ  with Tr ρ x x{ } = f .  
A superinformation theory “admits X-partitions of unity” (on the set of generalised 
mixtures of attributes in X) if conditions E1) and E2) are satisfied.  
A key innovation of this paper is showing how the mathematical construction of an 
abstract infinite ensemble (culminating in the property E1)) can define structure on 
individual systems (via property E2)) – the attributes  x f  and the X-partition of unity 
– without recourse to the frequency interpretation of probability or any other 
probabilistic assumption.  
X-partition of unity of the X-intrinsic part. Consider now the attribute of being in 
the quantum state  z = c0 0 + e
iφc1 1  whose X-partition of unity is  c0
2 , c1
2⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ . In 
quantum theory, the reduced density matrices of the source and target substrate as 
delivered by an X-measurer acting on  z  still have the same partition of unity. The 
same holds in constructor theory. Consider the X-intrinsic part  az[ ]X  (section 4) of the 
attribute  az  generated by measuring X on the attribute z. By definition of  
!
Dx( N) , 
                                                
21 The existence of 
 x f ∞
 does not require there to be any corresponding attribute of the single system for finite N: 
 x f ∞
 is constructed as a limit of a sequence of attributes on the ensemble. For example in quantum theory most sets 
 
X fi(N) ! z : z
(N) ⊆ x fi( N ){ }  are empty, for any N, except for  fi
(N) = 1 , containing  x(N) ; and  fi
(N) = 0 , containing all 
attributes  !x(N) : !x∈X , !x ≠ x . 
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prepending a measurer of X to each of the input substrates of  
!
Dx( N) will still give a 
 
!
Dx( N) , with the same labellings. Thus the construction that would classify z as being 
in a certain X-partition of unity, can be reinterpreted as providing a classification of 
 az[ ]X , under the same labellings: the two classifications must coincide. If y has a given 
X-partition of unity, the X-intrinsic part  az[ ]X  of  az  must have the same one. Likewise for 
the intrinsic part  bz[ ]X  of  bz (obtained as output attribute on the target of the X-
measurement applied to y): the ‘X’-partition of unity of  bz[ ]X  is numerically the 
same as the X-partition of unity of z. 
6. Conditions for decision-supporting superinformation theories 
For a given observable X and a generalised mixture z of attributes in X, the labels 
 f (z)x⎡⎣ ⎤⎦x∈X  of the X-partition of unity defined in section 6 are not probabilities. Even 
though they are numbers between 0 and 1, and sum to unity, they need not satisfy 
other axioms of the probability calculus: for instance, in quantum interference 
experiments they do not obey the axiom of additivity of probabilities of mutually 
exclusive events (Deutsch, Ekert & Lupacchini, 2000). It is the decision-theory 
argument (section 7) that explains under what circumstances the numbers  f (z)x⎡⎣ ⎤⎦x∈X  
can be used to inform decisions in experiments on finitely many instances as if they 
were probabilities, without assuming them to be so.  I shall now establish sufficient 
conditions on superinformation theories to support the decision-theory argument, 
thus characterising decision-supporting superinformation theories.  
I shall introduce one of the conditions via the special case of quantum theory. 
Consider the x- and y-components of a qubit spin,  Xˆ  and  Yˆ . There exist eigenstates 
of  Xˆ , i.e.  x1 , x2 , and of  Yˆ , i.e.  
y± =
1
2
x1 ± x2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  with the property that they are 
‘equally weighted’, respectively, in the x- and y- basis – in other words,  x1 , x2  are 
invariant under the action of a unitary that swaps  y+  with  y− ; and  y±  are 
invariant under a unitary that swaps  x1  with  x2 . Moreover, there exist quantum 
states on the composite system of two qubits, which are likewise ‘equally weighted’ 
and have the special property that: 
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1
2
x1 x1 ± x2 x2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ =
1
2
y+ y+ ± y− y−⎡⎣ ⎤⎦   (5) 
I shall now require that the analogous property holds in superinformation theories. 
While in quantum theory it is straightforward to express this property via the 
powerful tools of linear superpositions, in constructor theory expressing the same 
conditions will require careful definition in terms of ‘generalised mixtures’. 
The conditions for decision-supporting information theories is that there exist two 
complementary information observables X and Y such that: 
T1) The theory admits X-partitions of unity (on the information attributes 
of S that are generalised mixtures of attributes of X) and  Xa + Xb -partitions of 
unity (on the information attributes of the substrate  Sa ⊕Sb  that are generalised 
mixtures of the attributes in the observable  Xa + Xb ).  
T2) There exist observables  
!X " x1 ,x2{ }⊆ X ,  !Y " y+ ,y−{ }⊆ Y satisfying 
the following symmetry requirements: 
R1.  x1 ,x2  are generalised mixtures of   !Y  and  y1 ,y2{ }  are generalised mixtures of 
attributes of  !X . 
As a consequence, since 
 
u !X ,u !X{ }  is sharp in both  y+  and  y−  with value  u !X , it 
follows that f (y+)x = 0 = f (y−)x  for all x other than  x1  and  x2 . Similarly, 
 f (x1)y = 0 = f (x2)y ,∀y ≠ y+ ,y− .  Note also that by definition of complementary 
observables,  xi ∩ y± = o  – i.e., the attributes are non-trivial generalised mixtures. 
Defining the computation  Sa ,b ! a→ b,b→ a{ }  which swaps the attributes  a,b  of S: 
R2.  Sx1 ,x2 (y±)⊆ y± ;  Sy+ ,y− (xi)⊆ xi ,i = 1,2 .  
In quantum theory,  y±  correspond to two distinguishable equally-weighted 
quantum superpositions or mixtures of the attributes in  Xy , such as  y± . Similarly 
for  x1 , x2 . The principle of consistency of measurement (section 3) implies that if 
an attribute y has an X-partition of unity with element  f (y)x , for any permutation Π  
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on X,  Π(y)  has X-partition of unity such that f (Π(y))x = f (y)Π(x) . This is because 
presenting  Π(y)  to  
!
Dx(N)  (defined in section 5) is equivalent to presenting y to the 
constructor (measurer) obtained prepending the computation Π  to  
!
Dx(N)  - i.e., the 
constructor  
!
DΠ(x)(N) .  Therefore  Sx1 ,x2 (y±)⊆ y±  implies  f (y±)x1 = f (y±)x2 = 1/2.  The 
same, mutatis mutandis, holds for the attributes  x1 ,x2 . 
Let the attributes  ay±[ ]X ⊇ ay± be the X-intrinsic parts of the attributes  ay± , where 
 (ay± ,by± )  is the attribute of  Sa ⊕Sb  prepared by measuring X on  Sa  holding the 
attribute  y± , with  Sb as a target.   
R3.  ay+[ ]X = ay-[ ]X , with  Sx1 ,x2 ay±[ ]X( )⊆ ay±[ ]X  
This requirement is satisfied in quantum theory: a measurer of the quantum 
observable  Xˆ  acting on a substrate  Sa  in the state  y±  generates the quantum states: 
  
 
1
2
x1 x1 ± x2 x2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  
whose reduced density operators on  Sa  are the same,  
1
2 x1 x1 + x2 x2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ , and are 
still ‘equally weighted’, thus invariant under swap of   x1  and  x2 . 
Consider now the observables of the composite system  S⊕S : 
 
 
Sx ! (x1 ,x1),(x2 ,x2){ }⊆ X ×X
Sy ! (y+ ,y+),(y− ,y−){ }⊆ Y ×Y
  
R4. There exists an attribute q that is both a generalised mixture of attributes in  Sx and 
a generalised mixture of attributes in  Sy : 
 
q⊆ uSx ∩uSy , q ⊥ (xi ,xi), q∩ (xi ,xi) = o , i = 1,2( )
q ⊥ (y± ,y±), q∩ (y± ,y±) = o
 
with the property that: 
  Sx1x1 ,x2x2 (q)⊆ q, Sy+y+ ,y-y- (q)⊆ q  . (6) 
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where the swap S on a pair of substrates acts in parallel in each separately. In 
quantum theory, q is the attribute of being in the state  
1
√2 x1 x1 + x2 x2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ , because 
of the property (5).  
These conditions define a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. (See  
table 1 for a summary, and see also footnote 27). They are satisfied by quantum 
theory, as we said, via the existence of states such as those for which (5) holds. 
 
 Table 1: Conditions for decision-supporting superinformation theories 
7. Games and decisions with superinformation media 
The key step in the decision-theoretic approach in quantum theory is to model the 
physical processes displaying the appearance of stochasticity as games of chance, 
played with equipment obeying unitary (hence non-probabilistic) quantum theory. 
A superinformation theory is decision-supporting if there exist complementary 
observables X and Y such that: 
1) The theory admits X-partitions of unity (conditions E1), E2) in section 5) on 
the substrate S and  Xa + Xb( ) -partitions of unity on the substrate  Sa ⊕Sb . 
2) There exist attributes  x1 ,x2 ∈X  that are generalised mixtures of the 
attributes  y+ ,y−{ } ; and attributes  y+ ,y− ∈Y  that are generalised mixtures of 
attributes  x1 ,x2{ }  with the property that: 
•  Sx1 ,x2 (y±)⊆ y± ;  Sy+ ,y− (xi)⊆ xi ,i = 1,2 . 
•  ay+[ ]X = ay−[ ]X  and  Sx1 ,x2 ( ay±[ ]X )⊆ ay±[ ]X  
3) There exists an attribute q that is a generalised mixture of attributes in 
 Sx = (x1 ,x1),(x2 ,x2){ }  and a generalised mixture of attributes in 
 Sy = (y+ ,y+),(y− ,y−){ } , with the property that  
 Sx1x1 ,x2x2 (q)⊆ q,Sy+y+ ,y-y- (q)⊆ q  
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In the language of the partition of unity, applied to quantum theory, the game is 
informally characterised as follows. An X-measurer is applied with an input 
attribute y whose X-partition of unity is  f (y)x1 ,... f (y)xd⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ . The game-device is such 
that if the observable X is sharp in y with value x (so under quantum theory, y is an 
eigenstate of  Xˆ  with eigenvalue x), the reward is ‘x’ (in some currency); otherwise 
unpredictability arises (section 4). The player may pay for the privilege of playing 
the game, knowing y, the rules of the game, and unitary quantum theory (i.e. a full 
description of the physical situation). One proves that a player satisfying the same 
non-probabilistic axioms of rationality as in classical decision theory (Luce & Raiffa, 
1957), but without assuming the Born Rule or any other rule referring to probability, 
would place bets as if he had assumed both the identification between the  fx  and the 
probabilities of outcomes given by the Born Rule, and the ad-hoc methodological 
rule connecting probabilities with decisions (Papineau, 2006; Deutsch, 2015). 
I shall now recast the decision-theoretic approach (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2012) in 
constructor theory. The key differences from previous versions (Deutsch 1999, 
Wallace 2012) are: a) those versions involved the notions of observed outcomes and 
relative states, which are powerful tools in Everettian quantum theory. In 
constructor theory, instead, none of those will be explicitly relied upon; b) Some of 
the axioms that were previously considered decision-theoretic follow from 
properties of information media and measurements, as expressed in the constructor 
theory of information.  
7.1 Games of chance  
From now on, I shall assume that we are dealing with a decision-supporting 
superinformation theory – i.e., a superinformation theory satisfying the conditions 
given in section 6, with two complementary observables X and Y. For simplicity, I 
shall assume X and Y to be real-valued, whereby X and Y are the set of real numbers. 
In this context, I shall adopt a slightly more detailed model of a game of chance, 
whose centrepiece is an X-adder. It is defined as the constructor  
!
ΣX  performing the 
following computation on an information medium S⊕S p ⊕S p : 
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x ,p,0( )→ x ,p,x + p( ){ }
x∈X ,p∈Xp
∪   (7) 
 An X-adder is a measurer of the observable 
 
X + X
p
 of the substrate S⊕S p  labelled so 
that when the observable X is sharp in input with value x and the observable  Xp  is 
sharp in input with value 0,  Xp  is sharp on the output payoff substrate with value x. 
For any fixed p, this is also a measurer  (as defined in (3)) of the observable X on  S .22 
In quantum theory, it is realised by a unitary satisfying 
 U : x p 0 → x p p+ x ,∀x,p .  
An X-game23 of chance GX (z)  is a construction defined as follows: 
G1) The game substrate  S  (e.g. a die), with game observable  X = x : x∈X{ } , is prepared 
with some legitimate game attribute z, defined as any information attribute that admits 
an X-partition of unity (where X may be non-sharp in it) . 
G2)  S  is then presented in input to an adder together 
with two other payoff substrates 
 
S
p
, representing the 
player’s records of the winnings, with payoff 
observable 
 
Xp = x : x∈X{ } . The first instance of  Sp  
(the input payoff substrate) contains a record of the 
initial (pre-game) assets, in some units; the other 
instance (the output payoff substrate), initially at 0, 
contains the record of the winnings at the end of the 
                                                
22 An adder is a measurer of the same observable X  for all p: it distinguishes between any two different attributes 
in X  for any p. (This is a non-trivial property: a multiplier, for instance, would not do so for p=0). 
23 Under constructor theory a game of this sort must be defined with respect to given labellings of the attributes. 
E.g. if the slots on a roulette wheel were re-labelled, a ball landing in a particular slot would cause different 
players to win. 
Figure 5
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game and it is set during the game to its payoff under the action of the adder.. 
Keeping track of both those records is an artefact of my model, superfluous in real 
life, but it makes it easier to analyse composite games. 
G3) The composition of two games of chance  GX (z)⊙GX (z') , with game substrates Sa  
and Sb  is defined as the construction where the output payoff substrate of GX (z)  is 
the input payoff substrate of GX (z')  (figure 5, top). In other words, the composite 
game  GX (z)⊙GX (z')  is an ( Xa + Xb )-adder realised by measuring the observable 
 Xa + Xp  and the observable  Xb + Xp  separately. Thus, the composition of two games 
 GX(z)⊙GX(z')  is the game  GXa+Xb ((z,z'))  with game substrate  Sa ⊕Sb  (figure 5, 
bottom). 
The player. I shall model the player for  GX(z)  as a programmable constructor (or 
automaton)  
!
Γ  whose legitimate inputs are: the specification of the game attribute z, 
the (deterministic) rules of the game (with the game observable X) and the subsidiary 
theory. Its program must also be such that it satisfy the following axioms: 
A1. Ordering. Given z and z’, the automaton orders any two games  GX(z)  
and  GX(z')  - the ordering is transitive and total.  
In this constructor-theoretic version of the decision-theory argument, this is the only 
classical decision-theoretic axiom required of the automaton. It corresponds to the 
transitivity of preferences in (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2012). Its effect is to require  
!
Γ  to 
be a constructor for the task of providing in output a real number  V GX(z){ }∈X  – the 
value of the game. Specifically, I define the value of the game  GX(z) ,  V GX(z){ } , as the 
unique  vz ∈X  with the property that  
!
Γ  is indifferent between playing the game 
 GX(z)  and the game  GX(vz) . As the reader may guess, the key will turn out to be that 
attributes with the same partition of unity have the same value.  
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A2. Game of chance. The only observables allowed to condition24 the 
automaton’s output are: (i) the observable for whether the rules of the game are 
followed; (ii) the observable  DXp , defined as the difference between the observable 
 Xp  of the first reward substrate before the game, and the observable  Xp  of the 
second reward substrate after the game, as predicted by the automaton (given the 
specification of the input attribute and the subsidiary theory).25  
 
Thus, whether other observables than the ones of axiom 2 may be sharp is irrelevant 
to the automaton’s output. Otherwise, those observables would have to be 
mentioned in the program to condition the automaton’s output (thus specifying a 
player for a different game). This fact shall be repeatedly used in section 7.2, to show 
properties (P1-P6). 
In classical decision theory any monotonic rescaling of the utility function causes no 
change in choices; so, without losing generality, I shall assume that whenever the 
observable  DXp  is predicted by the automaton to be sharp on the payoff substrate with 
value x, the automaton outputs a substrate holding a sharp  vx = x .  
7.2 Properties of the value function 
As I promised, axiom 1 and 2 imply crucial properties, which were construed as 
independent decision-theoretic axioms in earlier treatments, but here they follow 
from the other axioms and the principles of constructor theory, under decision-
supporting superinformation theories. Namely: 
                                                
24 An observable O conditions the output of the automaton if its program, given the specification of the input 
attribute and the subsidiary theory, effectively contains an instruction: “if O is sharp with some value o, then …” 
25 Note that under constructor theory, as under quantum theory, this must be an observable because of the 
principle of consistency of measurement (section 3). (In quantum theory, those two observables commute even 
though they are at different times.) 
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P1.  
!
Γ ’s preferences must be constant in time. Otherwise the observable ‘elapsed time’ 
would have to condition the program, violating axiom A2. 26 
P2. Substitutability of games (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Deutsch, 1999).  The value of a game 
 GX(z)  in isolation must be the same as when composed with another game  GX(z') . 
Otherwise, again, the automaton’s program would have to be conditioned on the 
observable “what games  GX(z)  is composed with”, violating axiom A2. 
P3. Additivity of composition. Setting  V GX(z){ } = vz  and  V GX(z'){ } = vz' , P2 implies: 
  V GX(z)⊙GX(z'){ } =
by substitutability, definition of value
↓
V GX(vz)⊙GX(vz' ){ } =
by definition of ⊙ , 
definition of value
↓
vz + vz'   (8) 
P4. Measurement neutrality (Wallace, 2007). Games where the X-adder (under the given                                   
labellings) has physically different implementations must have the same value – 
otherwise the observable ‘which physical implementation’ should have to be 
included in the automaton’s program, violating axiom A2. Measurement neutrality, 
in turn, allows one to show the following additional properties: 
a. The game  GX(Π(z)) – where the 
computation Π  (for any permutation Π  over X) 
acts on S immediately before the adder (figure 6) 
– is a  Π(X) -adder, where  Π(X)  denotes the 
relabelling of X given by Π . Hence, it can be regarded as a particular physical 
implementation of the game  GΠ(X)(z) . Therefore, measurement neutrality implies: 
  V GΠ(X)(z){ } =V GX(Π(z)){ }  . (9) 
 
                                                
26 This condition is a cognate of Wallace’s diachronic consistency (Wallace, 2012), although the latter is expressed 
via composition of games based on relative states, which here can be dispensed with. 
Figure 6 
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b. Since  GX(za)⊙GX(zb)  is a particular physical implementation of  GXa+Xb ((za ,zb))  
(figure 5), by measurement neutrality the values of games on composite substrates must 
equal that of composite games:  
 
V GXa+Xb (za ,zb){ } =V GX(za)⊙GX(zb){ } = vza + vzb   (10) 
where the last step follows from (8).	
c. Let the attributes  ay[ ]X  and  by[ ]X  be 
the X-intrinsic parts  ay[ ]X ⊇ ay  and 
 by[ ]X ⊇by  of the attributes  ay  and  by (section 
4), where  (ay ,by)  is the attribute of  Sa ⊕Sb  
prepared by measuring X on  Sa  in the 
attribute y, with  Sb as a target. By 
prepending a measurer of  X  to the X-adder in 
the game  GX(y) , so that the measurer’s source is the input of the X-adder (figure 7 
bottom left), one still has the same X-adder. Thus, the X-game  GX( ay[ ]X )  (figure 7, 
top) has the same physical implementation as the X-game  GX(y)  (figure 7, bottom 
right). Similarly, by concatenating a measurer of X to an ‘X’-adder so that the 
former’s target is the game substrate of the latter, one obtains an X-adder overall, 
whereby the ‘X’-game  G‘X ’( by[ ]X ) has the same physical implementation as the X-
game  GX(y) . The same applies if one considers  GΠ(X)(y) , for any permutation Π  
over X. Measurement neutrality implies: 
  V GΠ(X)( ay[ ]X ){ } =V GΠ(X)(y){ } =V G‘Π(X)’( by[ ]X ){ }.   (11) 
   d. Shift rule (Deutsch 1999). Define the 
uniform shift as the permutation 
Figure 7 
Figure 8 
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Tk = x→ x + k{ }
x∈X
∪ , for real k. The game  GXa+Xb (z,k)  (figure 8, right) is a particular 
implementation of the game  GTk (X)(z) (figure 8, left), where the  Tk(X) -adder is 
realised by measuring  Xa + Xb  on   Sa ⊕Sb  in the attribute  (z,k) , for a fixed  k∈X . By 
measurement neutrality and equation (10):	
  V GTk (X)(z){ } =V GXa+Xb (z,k){ } = vz + k  .   (12) 
 
P5. The “equal value” property. In quantum theory, a superposition or mixture of 
two orthogonal quantum states such that X-games played with them have the same 
value v, has value v (Deutsch, 1999). A generalisation of this property holds under 
decision-supporting superinformation theories. A crucial difference from the 
argument in (Deutsch, 1999) is that here there is no need explicitly to resort to 
observed outcomes or relative states to prove this property. Let  H = h1 ,h2{ }  be an 
information variable of a game substrate  Sa , such that X-games played with  h1  or  h2  
have the same value v:  V{GX(h1)} = v =V{GX(h2)} . Consider the information attribute q, 
having an X-partition of unity, with the property that q is a generalised mixture of H 
– whereby  q⊆ uH .  I shall now prove that the X-game with game attribute q has also 
value v:  V{GX(q)} = v . In the trivial case that  q = h1 or  q = h2 ,  V{GX(q)} = v . Consider 
the case where, instead, q is a non-trivial generalised mixture of  H = h1 ,h2{ } : 
 q⊆ uH ,  q∩hi = o ,  q ⊥ hi ,∀i = 1,2 .  In quantum theory, q corresponds to the attribute 
of being in a superposition or mixture of distinguishable quantum states 
 h1 , h1  : h1 h2 = 0  – e.g., the quantum state  q = α h1 +β h2( )  for complex  α,β . I 
shall show that  GX(q)  is equivalent to another game with value v, obtained by 
applying the following procedure on the game substrate  Sa .  
First, measure H on  Sa  holding the attribute q, with an ancillary system  Sb  as a 
target of the H-measurer. This delivers the substrate  Sa ⊕Sb  in the attribute  (aq ,bq) . 
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By the properties of the intrinsic part (section 3),  aq[ ]X  still is a generalized mixture 
of the attributes in H:  aq ⊆ aq[ ]X ⊆ uH ,  aq[ ]X ∩hi = o ,  aq[ ]X ⊥ hi ,  ∀i = 1,2( ) . Thus, 
 V{GX(q)} =V{GX( aq[ ]X )} , because both q and  aq[ ]X  have the same specification qua X-
game attributes. Next, apply a constructor 
 
!
C
H
 for the following task (a control 
operation in quantum theory): if ‘H’ is sharp with value  'h1 '  on  Sb , nothing happens 
on  Sa ; whereas if ‘H’ is sharp with value  'h2 '  on  Sb , then  h2  on  Sa  is replaced by the 
attribute  h1 . Applying  
!
C
H
 does not change the value of the game on  Sa , for the 
attributes on the game substrate  Sa  before (i.e.,  aq[ ]X ) and after (i.e.,  h1 ) the action of 
 
!
C
H
 have the same specification: they are both generalised mixtures of attributes in 
H. Thus,  V{GX(q)} =V{GX( aq[ ]X )} =V{GX(h1)} = v , as promised.  
P6.The reflection rule. 
Under decision-supporting superinformation theories, including quantum theory, 
the property that I shall call the reflection rule follows. It is the superinformation 
version of Deutsch’s (1999) ‘zero-sum rule’, but, again, the present derivation does 
not depend on relative states or observed outcomes in universes. Consider the 
attributes  y+  and  y− , satisfying the condition R1-R4 (section 6). By (11) and R3 it 
follows that: 
  V GΠ(X)(y+){ } =V GΠ(X)( ay±[ ]X ){ } =V GΠ(X)(y−){ }    
for any Π   over X. Hence, by the additivity of composition (property P3), it also 
follows that: 
 V GΠ(X)a+Π '(X)b (y+ ,y+){ } =V GΠ(X)a (y+){ }+V GΠ '(X) b (y+){ } =V GΠ(X)a+Π '(X)b (y− ,y−){ } (13) 
for any permutations Π ,  Π '   over X. Consider the game  GR(X)a+Xb (q)  where q satisfies 
conditions R4 (section 6) and the reflection R is the permutation over X defined by 
 
R = x → −x{ }
x∈X
∪ . The adder in the game is a measurer of  R(X) a + Xb , which, in turn, is 
an X-comparer (as defined in equation (4)) on the substrates  Sa  ,  Sb : it measures the 
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observable «whether the two substrates hold the same value x», where the output 0 
corresponds to «yes». By the consistency of successive measurements of X on the same 
substrate with attribute y, (section 3), the output variable of that measurer is sharp 
with value 0 when presented with an attribute which, like q, has the property that 
 q⊆ uSx  – where  Sx ! (x1 ,x1),(x2 ,x2){ } . In quantum theory, as I said, the attribute  q  
corresponds to the attribute of being in the quantum state  
1
√2 x1 x1 + x2 x2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ , 
which is a 0-eigenstate of the observable − Xˆa + Xˆb . Thus, by definition of value, the 
value of  GR(X)a+Xb (q)  must be 0.  
On the other hand, since  q⊆ uSy  where  Sy ! (y+ ,y+),(y− ,y−){ }  and, by (13), both 
 GR(X)a+Xb (y− ,y−)( )  and  GR(X)a+Xb (y+ ,y+)( )  have the same value, by the ‘equal-value’ 
property (e), one has:  V GR(X) a +Xb (q){ } =V GR(X)a+Xb (y+ ,y+)( ){ }   
Hence: 
 
0 =V GR(X) a +Xb (q){ } =V GR(X)a+Xb (y+ ,y+)( ){ } =V GR(X)(y+)⊙GX(y+){ }  
where the last step follows by (10). Finally, one obtains, as promised: 
  V GR(X)(y+){ } = −V GX(y+){ }   (14) 
It follows that if some attribute  !y  is invariant under reflection ( R !y( )⊆ !y ) then 
 V GX( !y){ } = 0 , because:  
 
 
 
V GX( !y){ } =V GX(R( !y)){ } =
Measurement Indifference
↓
V GR(X)( !y){ } =
Reflection Rule
↓
−V GX( !y){ }   (15). 
 
7.3 The decision-theoretic argument under decision-supporting superinformation theories 
I shall now show that if an attribute y has X-partition of unity  f (y)x1 ,... f (y)xd⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  then  
 
 
V GX(y){ } = f (y)x x
x∈X
∑   (16) 
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thereby showing that a program satisfying the axioms in 7.1 is possible, under 
decision-supporting superinformation theories. The automaton with that program 
must value the game using the  f (y)x  as if they were the probabilities of outcomes, 
without assuming (or concluding!) that they are. Thus it places bets in the same way as 
a corresponding automaton would, if programmed with the same axioms of classical 
decision theory plus additional, ad hoc probabilistic axioms connecting probabilities with 
decisions (e.g., that the ‘prudentially best option’ maximises the expected value of 
the gain (Papineau, 2006)) and some stochastic theory with the  f (y)x  as probabilities 
of outcomes x (e.g. quantum theory with the Born Rule). 
My argument broadly follows the logic of Deutsch’s or Wallace’s formulation; 
however, individual steps rest on different constructor-theoretic conditions and do 
not use concepts specific to quantum theory or the Everett interpretation – e.g., 
subspaces, observed outcomes, relative states, universes, and instances of the player 
in ‘universes’ or ‘branches of the multiverse’. 
Consider the attribute  y+ , satisfying conditions (R1-R4). Recall that it is symmetric 
under swap:  Sx1 ,x2 (y+)⊆ y+ , which implies  f (y±)x1 = f (y±)x2 = 1/2. This special case of 
‘equal weights’ provides the pivotal step in the decision-theory argument, just as in 
Deutsch or Wallace. 
The shift rule (12) with  k = −(x1 + x2)  gives: 
  V{GX(T−(x1+x2 )(y+))} =V{GX(y+)}− (x1 + x2)   (17) 
Now,  T−(x1+x2 )  can be implemented by composing the swap  Sx1 ,x2  and the reflection R. 
By measurement neutrality (P4), the reflection rule (14) and the symmetry 
 Sx1 ,x2 (y+)⊆ y+ : 
 V GX(T−(x1+x2 )(y+)){ } =V GX(R(Sx1 ,x2 (y+))){ } = −V{GX(y+)}  
By comparison with (17):  
 
 
V{GX(y+)} =
(x1 + x2)
2   (18) 
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which is a special case of (16) when the game attribute  y+  has an X-partition of unity 
whose non-null elements are  f (y+)x1 = f (y+)x2 = 1/2 . This is the central result proved 
by Deutsch and Wallace, but now proved from the physical, constructor-theoretic 
properties of measurements. The general, ‘unequal weights’, case follows by an 
argument analogous to (Deutsch, 1999), with a few conceptual differences outlined 
in the appendix.   
What elements of reality the elements of a partition of unity in (16) represent 
depends on the subsidiary theory in question: it is not up to constructor theory (nor 
to the decision-theory argument) to explain that. The decision-theoretic argument 
only shows that decisions can be made, when informed by a decision-supporting 
superinformation theory, under a non-probabilistic subset of the classical axioms of 
rationality, as if it were a stochastic theory with probabilities given by the elements 
in the partition of unity. In particular, in unitary quantum theory that argument is 
not (as it is often described) a ‘derivation of the Born Rule’, but an explanation of 
why, without assuming the Born Rule, in the situations where it would apply, one 
must use the moduli squared of the amplitudes (and only those) to inform decisions 
as if the Born Rule held. Here I have shown that the equivalent is true for any 
constructor-theory-compliant subsidiary theory satisfying the stated criteria. Thus, 
such theories can, just as unitary quantum theory, account for the appearance of 
stochastic behaviour without appealing to any stochastic law.  
8. Conclusions 
I have reformulated the problem of reconciling unitary quantum theory, 
unpredictability and the appearance of stochasticity in quantum systems, within the 
newly proposed constructor theory of information, where unitary quantum theory is a 
particular superinformation theory – a non-probabilistic theory obeying constructor-
theoretic principles. I have provided an exact criterion for unpredictability; then I have 
shown that superinformation theories (and thus unitary quantum theory) satisfy that 
criterion, showing that unpredictability follows from the impossibility of cloning 
certain sets of states, and that it is compatible with deterministic laws. This 
distinguishes it from randomness.  
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Then, I have exhibited conditions under which superinformation theories can inform 
decisions in games of chance, as if they were stochastic theories – by giving 
conditions for decision-supporting superinformation theories. To this end, I have 
generalised to constructor theory the Deutsch-Wallace quantum decision-theoretic 
approach, which shows how unitary quantum theory (with no Born Rule) can 
inform decisions in those games as if the Born Rule were assumed.  
My constructor-theoretic approach improves upon that approach in two ways: 1) Its 
axioms, formulated in constructor-information-theoretic terms only, make no use of 
concepts specific to Everettian quantum theory, thus broadening the domain of 
applicability of the approach to decision-supporting superinformation theories; 2) It 
shows that some of the assumptions that were previously considered as purely 
decision-theoretic, and thus criticised for being ‘subjective’ (viz. measurement 
neutrality, diachronic consistency, the zero-sum rule), follow from the physical 
properties of superinformation media, measurers and adders, as required by the newly 
proposed laws of constructor theory.  
So the axioms of the decision-theory approach turn out not to be particular, ad-hoc 
axioms necessary for quantum theory only, as it was previously thought; instead, 
they are either physical, information-theoretic requirements (such as the principle of 
consistency of measurement, interoperability, and the conditions for decision-
supporting superinformation theories) or general methodological rules of scientific 
methodology (such as transitivity of preferences) required by general theory testing. On 
this ground, Deutsch (2015) has recently shown how not only quantum theory, but 
all decision-supporting superinformation theories (as defined in this paper) are 
testable in regard to their statements about repeated unpredictable measurements.  
The present paper and Deutsch’s one, taken together, imply that it is possible to 
regard the set of decision-supporting superinformation theories as a set of theoretical 
possibilities for a local, non-probabilistic generalisation of quantum theory, thus 
providing a new framework where the successor of quantum theory may be sought.  
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Appendix 
To prove the general case one follows the same logic as in (Deutsch, 1999). There are 
a number of conceptual differences, which I shall outline here via an example from 
quantum theory.  
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One first addresses the generalised symmetric case, proving that 
 
 
V GX y( ){ } = 1n xkk=1
n
∑   (19) 
whenever  
y ⊆ uXy ,  Xy = {x1 ,x 2 ,...,xn}  and  Sxi ,xj (
y)⊆ y  for all i,j - i.e., by the 
arguments in section 6.2, y has a partition of unity with elements  f (y)xi = 1/n,  ∀ xi . 
This corresponds to equally weighted superpositions or mixtures, e.g. 
 
y = 1n xll=1
n
∑ . The proof follows directly from the equal-value property, P5, via the 
same steps as in (Deutsch, 1999), so it will not be reproduced here.  
In the general non-symmetric case, one shows that for any integers  m ≥ 0,  n > m : 
  
V GX y( ){ } = mx1 + (n−m)x2n                               (20) 
where y is a generalised mixture of  Xy = x1 ,x 2{ } , such that f (y)x1 =
m
n , so that (by 
the properties of the X-partition of unity) 
 
f (y)x2 =
n−m
n . In quantum theory, y 
corresponds to the attribute of being in some superposition or mixture with that 
partition of unity, e.g. 
 
y = mn x1 +
(n−m)
n x2 . (The continuum case follows as in 
(Deutsch, 1999)). 
From the additivity of composition (P3) and the definition of value, it follows that 
for any game attribute y, 
 
V GXa+Xb (y , !y)( ){ } =V GX(y){ } , whenever  V GX( !y){ } = 0 .  
One way of preparing the composite substrate  Sa ⊕Sb  so that  Sa  has an attribute 
with the same value as y and  Sb  holds an attribute with value 0 is to prepare the 
quantum state 
 
s = mn x1 o1 +
(n− m)
n x2 o2
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠  
on  Sa ⊕Sb , by applying an X-
measurer to  Sa  in the state  y , such that the measurer’s output attribute  o1  is that of 
being in the state 
 
o1 !
1
m
xn
n=1
∑ , and the output attribute  o2  is that of being in 
Chiara Marletto Constructor Theory of Probability 
 
 48 
 
the state 
 
o2 !
1
(n−m)
xn
n=m+1
∑ , where both attributes are chosen to be invariant under 
reflection,  R oi = oi , and distinguishable from one another,  o1 o2 = 0 .
27 By equation 
(15) it follows that  V GX(oi){ } = 0 . When  Sa ⊕Sb  has the attribute  s = (ay ,by)  of being 
in the quantum state  s , the substrate  Sa  holds the game attribute  ay⎡⎣ ⎤⎦X  – the X-
intrinsic part of  ay . The substrate  Sb  has the game attribute  by⎡⎣ ⎤⎦'X ' corresponding to 
the ‘X’-intrinsic part of  by , which, by the properties of the intrinsic part, is a 
generalised mixture of  o1  and  o2 , each of which generates an X-game with value 0.  
Because of the equal-value property, the game played with  by⎡⎣ ⎤⎦'X '  must have the 
same value 0. Therefore 
 
V GXa+Xb (s){ } =  V GX( ay⎡⎣ ⎤⎦X){ }+V GX( by⎡⎣ ⎤⎦'X ' ){ } =V GX( ay⎡⎣ ⎤⎦X){ } =V GX(y){ }               (21) 
where the last step follows from the property c. 
On the other hand, since  
s = 1
n
x1 xnn=1
m∑ + x2 xnn=m+1
n∑( ) , the symmetric-case 
result (18) applies, giving  V GXa+Xb (s){ } =  
mx1 + (n−m)x2
n , as  Xa + Xb  is sharp in the 
attribute of being in the state 
 
x1 xk
k=1
m
∑  with value !mx2  and in that of being 
in
 
x1 xk
k=m+1
n
∑  with value  n−m( )x2 . Thus equation (21) proves the result (20): 
 
V GX y( ){ } = mx1 + (n−m)x2n , 
as promised. 
                                                
27 That this preparation is possible is guaranteed by the properties of quantum theory, but it is not clear whether 
that is true in general superinformation theories; I conjecture that it is, but if not, it would an additional physical 
condition on decision-supporting information theories, to be included in table 1. 
